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Increasingly, immigration policies tend to favour the entry of skilled workers, raising
substantial concerns among sending countries. The ‘revisionist’ approach to the analysis
of the brain drain holds that such concerns are largely unwarranted. First, sustained
migratory flows may be associated with an equally large flow of remittances. Second,
migrants may return home after having acquired a set of productive skills. Finally, the
ability to migrate abroad may boost the incentive to acquire skills by home residents.
This paper takes a further look at the link between skilled migration, education, and
remittances. It finds little support for the revisionist approach. First, a higher skilled
content of migration is found to be associated with a lower flow of remittances. Second,
there is little evidence suggesting that raising the skill composition of migration has a
positive effect on the educational achievements in the home country.
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1 Introduction
In the nineteenth century migration flows played a key role in fostering income
convergence between Europe and the United States (O’Rourke et al. 1996). In the
present globalization episode, however, the role of migration is much more limited
(Faini et al. 1999). This is not because of lack of economic incentives. If anything,
income differentials between sending and receiving countries are significantly larger
than they were less than one century ago (Pritchett 1997).
Restrictive immigration policies in the traditional receiving countries largely account for
the more marginal role of migratory flows. Since 1974, immigration policies
particularly in Europe have taken an increasingly restrictive stance, seeking both to
discourage further immigration and favour return migration.
In the most recent decade migration policies have taken a new turn. In response to the
growing shortages of skilled labour, immigration polices have increasingly been geared
to favour the entry of skilled workers, while continuing to penalize unskilled flows.
Such trends raises major concerns among sending countries, on at least two counts.
First, sending countries will be substantially restricted in their ability to rely on
unskilled migration as an engine of growth and convergence. Second, the bias toward
skilled flows risks exacerbating the brain drain and could well deprive such countries
from their most skilled and talented people. On both counts, it is argued, growth
prospects in emigration countries will be curtailed.
The link between migration and growth in sending countries is however quite complex.
First, sustained migratory flows may be associated with an equally large flow of
remittances that may help relieve the foreign exchange constraint in the home country.
Second, migrants may return home after having acquired a set of productive skills with
a beneficial impact on the growth prospects of their home country. Finally, the policy
bias in host countries toward skilled flows may not necessarily penalize sending
countries. As argued most recently by Stark et al. (1997, 1998), the incentive to acquire
skills may be strengthened by the prospect of being able to migrate. Even in the
presence of a brain drain, therefore, the average education level of those left behind in
the home country may be higher than otherwise.
Accordingly, in this ‘revisionist’ approach to the analysis of the brain drain, skilled
migration may turn into a ‘brain gain’ even if no account is taken of the potentially
positive effects on the home country of remittances and return migration. Allowing for
such factors would then further strengthen the case of the revisionist approach, to the
extent for instance that skilled migrants, because of their higher earnings, are likely to
generate a larger flow of remittances.
As of now, however, the empirical evidence in support of the supposedly positive
effects of skilled migration on the home country is at best limited. Moreover, even the
theoretical predictions of the revisionist approach are not unambiguous. First, skilled
migrants may have looser links with their home country, for instance because they are
more likely to bring their family to the host country and may therefore remit less rather
than more. Second, prospective migrants may want to strengthen their chance for
admission to the host country by pursuing their graduate studies there. The most
talented individuals would then have an incentive to migrate at a relatively early stage2
of their school curriculum, thereby definitely reducing the average enrolment ratio in
the home country’s educational system. Contrary to the revisionist approach, then a
higher probability for skilled workers to migrate may be associated with a decline in the
home country’s educational achievements. Moreover, as shown in the early contribution
of Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), the brain drain may interact with domestic distortions
so as to unambiguously reduce welfare in the home country. Finally, even the impact of
return migration on the home country welfare may be less favourable than generally
presumed (Constant and Massey 2002).
The purpose of this paper is to take a further look at the theoretical underpinnings and
empirical evidence about the link between skilled migration, education, and remittances.
We find little support for the revisionist approach. On the contrary, our results suggest
that the concerns in sending countries about the economic impact of skilled migration
are warranted. First, a higher skilled content of migration is found to be associated with
a lower flow of remittances. As noted earlier, we interpret this result as indicating that
skilled migrants tend to loosen their links with their home country, are more likely to
bring their family to the host country and, therefore, have a lower propensity to remit.
Second, we find little evidence suggesting that raising the skill composition of
migration has a positive effect on the educational achievements in the home country. On
the contrary, the tertiary enrolment ratio in sending countries is negatively associated
with the skilled content of migration.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the
simple static welfare computation of outward migration. We then assess in section 3
how the skilled composition of migration affects education and remittances. We also
consider the role of return migration. Section 4 focuses on the existing institutional set-
up for international labour flows and concludes with some constructive suggestions.
2 The welfare impact of out-migration1 without a brain drain
One unresolved issue in the analysis of international migration is whether the welfare of
migrants should be attributed to the host or to the home country. Presumably, the simple
strategy would be to count temporary migrants that retain close links to their home
country in the sending country population and attribute permanent migrants to the
receiving country. Yet, this classification is fraught with difficulties, given that by and
large the initial intention of migrants to move permanently or temporarily may not
coincide with their final choice. Moreover, even permanent migrants retain some links
with their country of origin. Overall, therefore, it seems more appropriate to analyse the
welfare impact of migration separately for those left behind in the sending country, the
migrants themselves, and the receiving country (Bhagwati and Rodriguez 1975).
With these caveats in mind, we can turn to the standard representation of a two country
economy in Figure 1. Let A be the source country and I be the host country.
Employment in country A (LA) is measured from right to left, in country I (LI) from left
to right. The two schedules, MPLA and MPLI, measure the marginal productivity of
                                                
1 This section draws on Faini (2002).3
Figure 1















labour in country A and I respectively, both as a declining function of their employment
levels. The initial equilibrium is at point B. The post-migration equilibrium is at point
D, with BD workers having migrated from country A to country I. It can be easily seen
that those left behind in the home country suffer a welfare loss. The gains in labour
income (the area NEPQ) are more than offset by the losses in income from capital (the
area FEPQ). The net loss is equal to FEN. Conversely, the host country enjoys a net
welfare gain (HGE). What about migrants? They are clearly better off; otherwise they
would not have migrated. More crucially, the gains to migrants (FGEN) more than
offset the losses of those left behind. Independently of whether migrants are classified in
the home or the host country population, the key fact is that the gains from migration
overwhelm the losses of those left behind. Migrants could therefore fully compensate
the losers in their host country and still be better off. Moreover, while in most of the
welfare literature compensating income transfers are typically seen as a merely
theoretical possibility, in the case of migration such transfers do occur, in the form of
remittances. Summing up, the net welfare effect of migration on the sending country is
ultimately an empirical matter, and will depend on the way migrants are classified and
on the amount of remittances. Interestingly enough, these two factors are likely to be
closely interrelated to the extent that the propensity to remit may be larger for temporary
migrants. On both counts, therefore, the welfare of the sending country should increase.
Conversely, the flow of remittances from permanent migrants should be small. The
home country will then lose out both because migrants are no longer part of its welfare
and because remittances are small.4
But how large is the welfare effect of emigration? In a one-good two-factor economy,
the rough and ready formula for computing the aggregate welfare impact of migration
(Borjas 1995) is:
∆  Q/Q = -(α L m
2 ε )/2
where m is the out-migration rate, α L is the income share of labour, ε  is the elasticity of
wages with respect to labour, and the welfare change (∆ Q) is measured as a ratio to
initial GDP. Suppose that α L = 0.7, ε =1,2 and that 10 per cent of the home country
population lives abroad (m=0.10). The welfare loss from emigration would then be
equal to less than four-tenths of one per cent of annual GDP, a relatively small effect.
Would this effect be offset by remittances? Most likely yes, given the sheer size of
remittances. Consider for instance the case of Turkey where the share of the population
living abroad is fairly large, around 8 per cent (that is, m=0.08). During the 1990s
remittances averaged almost 2 per cent of GDP, dwarfing therefore the welfare loss
from emigration. Similarly, existing estimates suggest that slightly more than 7 per cent
of Mexico’s population lives abroad. According to our simple formula, welfare losses
should be about three tenths of one per cent of GDP. Remittances on the other hand
account for more than 1 per cent of GDP, more than offsetting therefore the loss from
emigration.
These are simple back-of-the envelope calculations. To answer the question whether the
net effect of out-migration is positive after allowing for remittances we would need
some firmer evidence on the relationship between remittances and the number of
migrants abroad. If we simply assume that the GDP share of remittances (R) is a
function of the percentage of the home country population living abroad,3 with R = β  m,
the welfare effect of out-migration becomes:
∆  Q/ Q = -(α L m
2 ε )/2 + β  m
Based on a simple cross-country regression, we take β  to be equal to 0.3. This estimate
is subject to errors but appears to indicate that if m is not exceedingly large, that is,
m < β /εα L ≅  .43, the welfare impact of additional out-migration is positive.
3 The brain drain as a hindrance to welfare and growth
Abstracting from the brain drain, the welfare impact of emigration is likely to be small
and more than offset by the flow of remittances. However, the calculations in the
previous section assume labour to be homogeneous. Still, the most often voiced concern
is that migration deprives sending countries of their most skilled and most
entrepreneurial workers. Skilled workers may generate strong positive externalities in
                                                
2 With CES production function, ε =(1-α L)/σ , where σ  is the elasticity of substitution. Then ε =1 is
consistent with α L=0.7 and σ =0.3.
3 This relationship however is likely to depend also on the skill composition of migration, the
attachment of migrants to their home country, the wage differentials between the host and the source
country and other complicating factors. A more accurate analysis of remittances behaviour is
presented below.5
production (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Lucas 1990) and lead to faster growth.
Moreover, the costs of education are typically borne by the home country, with its
attendant benefits being lost to the country if the worker emigrates (Bhagwati 1976). In
terms of Figure 1, the marginal productivity schedule would shift inward as a result of
the emigration of skilled workers and the dissipation of the related externalities. The
size of such an effect would wipe out the second order magnitude of the traditional
Harberger triangle described in the previous section.
While therefore the ‘old’ development literature tended to see the brain drain as a
significant hindrance to the economic prospects of developing countries, more recently
these concerns have been greatly amplified by the emphasis in the new growth theory
on human capital as a key engine of growth. In an interesting extension of the
endogenous growth approach, Miyagiwa (1991) shows that the emigration of skilled
workers will hurt mostly other skilled workers – those who do not migrate – that used to
benefit relatively more from the scale externality associated with a large pre brain drain
stock of skills. Contrary to conventional presumptions, unskilled workers would be
relatively less affected.
The development literature also held that the brain was a large scale phenomenon.
However, as acknowledged by Bhagwati (1976), the empirical evidence on the size of
the brain drain was at best patchy. Moreover, available data referred to flows rather than
stocks and captured only gross flows with no information on reverse migration. Most of
the evidence came from disparate and typically not comparable sources. In turn, lack of
systematic evidence severely hampered empirical investigations in this field.
Still, the size of the brain drain has been largely undisputed. More recently, Stalker
(1994) reports that sub-Saharan Africa lost 30 per cent of its skilled personnel between
1960 and 1987. The Caribbeans are also hard hit, presumably because of the proximity
to the US and the relative ease in emigrating there. For instance, Jamaica had to train
five doctors in order to keep one. More recently, the presumption about the size of the
brain drain has been confirmed by the excellent study of Carrington and Detragiache
(1998). This is the first attempt to provide systematic and comparable evidence on the
brain drain. The authors rely on the 1990 Census of the United States to estimate the
educational attainments of migrants there. They then relate these figures to the Barro-
Lee data on educational levels in the source country to get migration rates for separate
educational groups. Some selected results are reported in Table 1. The authors also
compute total migration rates to the OECD by assuming that for each sending country
the skill composition of OECD migration is the same as that to the US. Obviously, this
set of estimates is bound to be somewhat less reliable, particularly if migration to the
US only accounts for a relatively small share of total migration from a given country. In
spite of all these caveats, the results are remarkable. First, migration rates are
disproportionately large among educated people. Second, the absolute figures are
substantial. For instance in Ghana, more than 15 per cent of the home country
population with a tertiary education has migrated to the US. Extending the analysis to
the OECD raises the migration rate for this educational group to 25.7 per cent. This
latter figure must however be interpreted with some caution since only slightly more
than 50 per cent of Ghana’s migrants go to the US. The figures for poorer countries in
North America are equally impressive. More than 20 per cent of Mexicans with a
secondary education live in the US. For the Dominican Republic the figure rises to 29.7
per cent; for El Salvador to 29.1 per cent.6
Table 1
The brain drain: migration rates by educational attainments
(percentage of host country’s educational group)









Korea 1.2 5.7 3.3 14.9
Philippines 4.4 6.6 6.0 9.0
Ghana 0.3 15.1 0.7 25.7
Uganda 0.6 15.4 0.6 15.5
Domin. Rep. 29.7 14.2 30.5 14.7
Guatemala 29.1 13.5 29.1 13.5
Colombia 3.6 5.6 3.8 5.6
Mexico 20.9 10.3 20.9 10.3
Source: Carrington and Detragiache (1998).
4 The revisionist approach to the brain drain
Is the brain drain a definite concern for sending countries? Or are there any mitigating
factors? The traditional answer to the latter question is a cautious yes. First, as noticed
earlier, migration may be associated with a substantial flow of remittances toward the
home country. Under the plausible presumption that the earnings of skilled workers are
relatively larger, we would expect the flow of remittances associated with the brain
drain to be also more substantial. Second, skilled migrants may eventually return to
their home country and bring with them valuable skills that will contribute to economic
growth there. Third, and more recently, it has been argued that the prospect of migration
by itself may foster domestic investments in education, provided that returns to skills
are higher abroad. Stark et al. (1997, 1998), Mountford (1997) and Stark (2002) have all
developed models where the possibility of emigrating abroad may result in more
education even for those left behind. Beine et al. (2001) offer some empirical support to
the claim that the brain drain may boost growth in the sending countries. By and large,
therefore, the revisionist approach would hold that not only are there mitigating factors
to the brain drain but also that the emigration of skilled workers may be beneficial for
the home country. In Stark’s words, the argument against the brain is then ‘turned on its
head’.
In what follows we review the case for the revisionist approach. We assess separately
the three main arguments in favour of the ‘brain gain’ – the boost to remittances, the
role of return migration and the greater incentive to acquire education – on both
theoretical and empirical grounds. We conclude that the case for the brain gain is at best
unproven and argue that the more traditional concerns about the negative impact of the
emigration of highly skilled workers on the economic fortunes of sending countries
remains warranted.7
4.1 Does the brain drain boost remittances?
IMF data for the mid 1990s put the total amount of remittances to US$65 billion. To put
the number in perspective, this is larger than the total flow of official development
assistance. Remittances play indeed a critical role as a source of foreign exchange in
several countries, as documented by Table 2. The key question however is how
remittances are influenced by the skill composition of emigration. If skilled migrants
tend to remit more, then the concern about the welfare impact of the brain drain may be
diminished. Alternatively, the finding of smaller propensity to remit by skilled migrants
would magnify such concerns.
Table 2








CE Europe & Central Asia 4.16 2.70 37.00
Turkey 1.96 0.33 17.82
East Asia & Pacific 1.05 3.41 42.88
Philippines 5.46 1.96 34.67
Indonesia 0.24 1.07 26.82
Latin America & Caribbean 2.17 4.56 27.54
Colombia 1.16 0.23 17.24
Mexico 1.19 0.09 21.92
Middle East & N. Africa 7.19 3.07 32.20
Egypt 8.69 6.85 23.84
Morocco 6.68 2.76 26.08
South Asia 2.87 4.68 17.50
Bangladesh 3.05 4.49 9.19
India 1.59 0.64 9.70
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.71 15.06 27.42
Ethiopia 0.28 16.89 10.15
Nigeria 2.11 0.91 43.13
Senegal 3.04 12.99 28.84
Source: World Bank data.
Unfortunately, existing evidence on the propensity to remit of skilled workers is quite
limited. Early evidence showed that remittances tend to increase with the  level
of education (Johnson and Whitelaw 1974; Rempel and Lobdell 1978). For the case of
Philippines, however, Rodriguez and. Horton (1994) find that the educational level of
migrants has no effect on the amount of remittances. In addition to the limited and
sometimes conflicting evidence, there is a more fundamental problem with this strand of8
literature. Suppose that skilled migrants tend to stay longer abroad,4 say because they
are more willing to reunify with their families in the host country5 o r  f a c e  l e s s e r
constraints in their ability to do so. One typical finding of the remittance literature is
that the flow of remittances tend to decline with the length of the migrants’ stay (Lucas
and Stark 1985). Therefore, even a positive coefficient of education on remittances
cannot be taken as evidence that the brain drain is associated with a larger flow of
remittances. The direct effect of skills may indeed be positive, but the overall effect,
that controls for the longer propensity to stay of skilled migrants in the receiving
country, may well be negative. By and large, therefore, it is difficult to draw any firm
conclusions on the relationship between education and remittances from the existing
literature.
To cast further light on this issue, we report the findings in Faini (2002) who runs a
simple set of regressions relating the ratio of remittances to GDP (or, alternatively, to
the home country population) to a set of regressors that includes the stock of migrants,
the income per capita in the sending country and, crucially, the skilled composition of
migration. The latter variable comes from the Carrington and Detragiache data set.6
There is no control for the length of migrants’ stay in the host country. Hence, the
coefficient of skills should capture the total impact of education on remittances. The
results are shown in Table 3. Three facts stand out. First, as expected, remittances are an
increasing function of the stock of migrants. Second, remittances decline with income
per capita in the sending country, lending support to the altruistic motive for income
transfers. Third, and more crucially, remittances decline as the share of migrants with a
tertiary education goes up. The latter result is consistent with the notion that more
skilled migrants tend to move permanently to the host country. Their attachment to the
home country gets progressively weaker and so does the propensity to remit.
Additionally, the ease of family reunification that these migrants typically enjoy further
weakens their willingness to remit. Overall, these effects obfuscate the more traditional
channel where migrants with a higher education have larger earnings, and should
therefore remit more.
If confirmed by future research, these results are striking. Sending countries lose from
migration on three grounds. First, there is the standard welfare loss, as described by
Figure 1. Second, the loss of skills attendant on the brain drain typically carries a
negative externality. Third, skilled migration may lead to a smaller rather than a larger
flow of remittances.
                                                
4 More direct evidence on the positive relationship between education and duration of stay comes from
Reagan and Olsen (2000) for the US. Similarly, the intended duration of stay is found to rise with
education in Germany (Steiner and Velling 1994). This issue is more fully tackled in the next section.
5 Faini (2003) develops a simple model showing that high wage migrants have a larger propensity to
reunify with their family in the host country.
6 Given the way the Carrington Detragiache data set has been compiled, those sending countries for
which the share of migration to the US falls below 30 per cent – and for which therefore the data on
the skilled composition of migration are bound to be much less reliable – have been excluded from the
sample.9
Table 3
Remittances and the skill composition of emigration















Notes: REM: remittances; POP: working age population; SM: migrants abroad as a percentage
of the home country population; MSEC: percentage of population with a secondary
education living abroad; MTER: percentage of population with a tertiary education
living abroad; Ypc: income per capita in the home country. NOB: number of
observations. T-stats in parentheses.
4.2 Does return migration mitigate the concern about the brain drain?
Return migration has a significant bearing on the impact of the brain drain. Returnees
may bring back home not only their original skills but also those that they have acquired
during their stay in the host country. The original loss to the home country may then be
more than offset by the new and valuable skills that the migrants was able to acquire
abroad. Furthermore, as emphasized in the new migration literature, a temporary move
abroad may be a key component of a strategy designed to overcome domestic market
failures. For instance, if because of credit market imperfections a home country resident
is unable to undertake a profitable project, then a temporary stay abroad may allow him
or her to accumulate sufficient capital to finance such project. Similarly, in the absence
of complete insurance markets, a home country household may be unwilling to
undertake a high return but high risk project. Temporary migration, until the uncertainty
about the project is resolved, may offer a way out. Indeed, the household may reduce its
risk exposure by having some of its members migrate to a country where returns are not
perfectly correlated with the domestic economy. It may then be in a better position to
take on additional risk and hence to implement the project.10
On a more pessimistic note, returnees may be those that have not succeeded abroad.
Migrants will typically return home if their initial expectations about wages and
working conditions abroad are not met. In Duleep’s (1994) definition, these are
‘mistaken migrants’. Negative selection of returnees may also occur if skilled migrants
are in a better position to acquire new skills – say language proficiency – in the host
country. To the extent that such skills are imperfectly rewarded in the home country,
returnees will be those with more limited skill initially and lesser skill accumulation
abroad. Moreover, as already noticed, skilled migrants may be more willing to reunify
with their families in the host country or face lesser constraints in their ability to do so.
Once again, return migrants will be negatively selected.
Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) provide a fairly general model of return migration. They
show that whether returnees will be positively or negatively selected cannot be
determined on a priori ground. What can be said however is that, under fairly general
conditions, return migration will tend to amplify the initial selection bias. If migrants
were negatively selected to begin with, then returnees will be relatively more skilled.
Conversely, if migrants were initially relatively skilled, then the least skilled will most
likely return to their home country. Intuitively, if the initial selection bias is positive
with the more skilled also more prone to migrate, then the least skilled will be the
marginal migrants and will be more likely therefore to reconsider their initial decision.
In this case, return migration will be negatively selected and, as a result, will do little to
alleviate the negative welfare and growth impact of the brain drain.
There is considerable evidence about the negative selection bias of return migration.
Solimano (2002) reports that, at least in science and engineering (S&E), a large fraction
of PhD graduates from developing countries tend to remain in the US after graduating.
National Science Foundation data show that, four years after graduation, 88 and 79 per
cent of respectively China’s and India’s graduates in S&E are still working in the
United States. More comprehensive evidence comes from Lindstrom and Massey
(1994) for Mexican migrants, Reagan and Olsen (2000) for the US, Bauer and Gang
(1998) for Egypt, Steiner and Velling (1994) and Schmidt (1994) for Germany.
Rodriguez and. Horton (1994) show that, in the case of the Philippines, returnees are
somewhat less educated than those still abroad. Similarly, Knerr (1994) finds that for
Pakistan skilled migrants tend to stay longer abroad than unskilled workers. Finally,
Borjas (1989) shows that the least successful foreign scientists are more likely to return
home from the US.
In apparent contrast, Jasso and Rosenzweig (1988) for the US and Ramos (1992) for
Puerto Rican migrants to the US conclude that returnees tend to be more skilled.
However, these findings are not inconsistent with the Borjas and Bratsberg model to the
extent that returns to skills are relatively high in Puerto Rico and the initial flow of
migrants tend therefore to be negatively selected. Return migration, once again, tends to
amplify the initial selection bias.
The bottom line of this literature can be best summarized as follows. Return migration
will not provide much consolation to a country suffering from a brain drain problem.
Only if initial migrants were mostly unskilled, as in Puerto Rico’s case, will returnees
be positively selected. Otherwise, the loss of human skills will at best be mitigated by
return migration. There is also in addition some evidence that returnees have difficulties
in readapting to the economic and social environment of their home country (Dustmann
1996). Often, as observed by Knerr (1994) for Pakistan, skilled returnees tend to be11
unemployed for longer periods. Finally, as argued previously, if skilled migrants are
more able or more willing to reunify with their family, the home country residents will
be further penalized by the decline in remittances.
4.3 Educational achievements and the brain drain
The revisionist approach holds that the brain drain may foster growth by raising the
return to education. Stark (2002) and Beine et al. (2001) develop simple models where
the sheer possibility to migrate increases the return to education, thereby fostering
further investments for skill acquisition and ultimately boosting growth. Beine et al.
(2001) also provide some cross-country evidence in support of such claim.
From an analytical point of view, the conclusion that the brain drain will boost the
incentive for education is not particularly new. The early literature on this issue fully
acknowledged this possibility (Bhagwati and Hamada 1974), but went further to assess
the interplay between the brain drain and domestic distortions. Bhagwati and Hamada
(1974) and Hamada and Bhagwati (1976) show that even in the case where skilled
workers are involuntarily unemployed in the home country (and their marginal
productivity is plausibly small if not nil) the brain drain may be detrimental to the home
country. Therefore, allowing unemployed or underemployed doctors to migrate may not
necessarily raise home welfare. First, in the absence of the possibility to migrate abroad,
the doctor may have moved inland where his social marginal productivity is likely to be
high. Second, the increase in the return to education may prompt more workers to seek
education, even more so if the domestic wage of domestic skilled workers tend to catch
up with its foreign level. Skilled unemployment would then go up if the increase in the
supply of skilled workers combined with the fall in their demand more than offsets the
impact of skilled migration. Finally, income per capita of those left behind would fall on
the account both of the larger costs of education (which reduce home GDP) and the fall
in skilled employment. Bhagawti and Hamada (1974) aptly conclude that ‘in the society
where welfare function depends on per capita income and unemployment rate, national
welfare will quite possibly go down’.
On the empirical front, the evidence of Beine et al. (2001) is not conclusive. Their main
finding is that in relatively poor sending countries educational levels are positively
associated with migration. However, this result is not necessarily consistent with the
revisionist view that skilled migration encourages more investment in education. Given
that the authors use data on total rather than skilled migration, their result is also
compatible with the very simple notion that migrants from relatively poor countries are
mostly unskilled. Large flows of unskilled migrants would then almost automatically
lead to a rise in the average skill level of those left behind in the home country. Hence,
the finding that (total) migration and human capital at home are positively correlated.
The bottom line therefore is that aggregate migration data cannot be used to find out
whether skilled migration fosters education. To correctly identify the effect of the brain
drain what is absolutely needed are data on the skill composition of migration. This is
indeed what the Carrington and Detragiache data set provides. Using this information,
Faini (2003) estimates a simple equation relating educational achievements to a set of
explanatory variables that include emigration. Rather than relying on the total migration
rate – a fairly inadequate measure of the incentive to acquire skills – the Carrington and
Detragiache data set is used to define an indicator of the migration probability for each12
educational group. These probabilities therefore are both country and skill specific. The
results do not support the conclusions of Beine et al. (2001). First, a higher migration
probability for workers with a secondary education has no visible impact on the home
country secondary educational achievements. The coefficient has the ‘wrong’ sign but is
not significantly different from zero. Second, a higher probability of migration for
workers with a tertiary education has a significant and positive impact on the rate of
secondary school enrolment. This finding suggests that increasing the return of higher
(tertiary) education boosts the incentive to acquire lower (secondary) education. Third,
and perhaps more surprisingly, the migration probability for workers with a tertiary
education has a negative impact on tertiary enrolment. One way to interpret this result is
to argue that prospective migrants may want to strengthen their chance for admission to
the host country by pursuing their graduate studies there. The most talented individuals
would then have an incentive to migrate at a relatively early stage of their school
curriculum, thereby definitely reducing the average enrolment ratio in the home
country’s university system. The evidence in the previous section about the large
fraction of S&E doctoral graduates from developing countries still working in the US
four years after graduation is consistent with the notion that prospective migrants pursue
their graduate students abroad also with a view to strengthening their chance of being
able to immigrate.
These results provide little evidence in support of the ‘brain gain’ argument. It is true
that a higher probability of migration for individuals with a tertiary education seems to
raise the return to secondary education. However, it is also associated with a lower level
of tertiary enrolment. To fully assess the growth impact of these conflicting effects one
would need to estimate a growth equation controlling for both secondary and tertiary
education. In assessing the full effect of the brain drain, its impact on the flow of
remittances will also have to be taken into account.
5 Conclusions and policy implications
We find little support for the optimistic view that the bias toward skilled migration in
host countries may be beneficial for sending countries. Our results add therefore to the
concern that the process of globalization may unduly penalize relatively poor countries.
First, the bias against unskilled migration may deprive these countries from one of the
most powerful engine of growth and convergence. Second, the growing preference for
skilled migration may exacerbate the effects of the brain drain and further hamper
growth prospects in sending countries. To the traditional case against the brain drain, I
have highlighted in this paper the possibility that skilled migrants may have, perhaps
surprisingly, a lower propensity to remit. I have also shown that, while it is true that a
more liberal policy toward skilled migration may raise the return to secondary
education, this effect is to some extent negated by the unfavourable impact on tertiary
enrolment. Finally, I have argued that the evidence on the supposedly beneficial impact
of return migration is far from conclusive.
Policymakers have been increasingly preoccupied with the new round of trade
negotiations and with the global financial architecture. These concerns are fully
warranted, given the need to expand and strengthen the multilateral trade system on the
one hand and to prevent the recurrence of disruptive financial crises in emerging
markets on the other. At the same time, however, little or no attention has been devoted13
to a key component of the international economic system, namely the international
labour market. A more symmetric approach to global policymaking would then require
to define a multilateral framework for labour mobility (along the lines perhaps
suggested by Rodrik 2002; see also Solimano 2001) and add labour standards to the
existing proliferation of international codes. This would involve strengthening the
‘fourth’ international economic institution, in addition to the IMF, the World Bank, and
the WTO: the International labour Office. The ILO was created well before the other
three institutions. As one of its senior officials stated, it relies mainly on ‘persuasion’ to
convince member countries to adopt and implement its codes. It has limited resources
and, as a result, a very much scaled down surveillance activity. Still, it is the recognized
standard setting agency in the field of labour. Its role should be strengthened by
broadening its mandate, to include for instance the definition of a multilateral
framework for migration, by expanding its surveillance role, and by providing it with
additional resources. The new ILO would not work through sanctions, as the WTO, or
through conditionality, as the IMF. A closer cooperation with the World Bank should be
envisaged with a view to providing additional finance to countries that are genuinely
intent to reform their labour markets. The reform of the ILO along these lines should
loom high on the international economic agenda.
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